Iberian Peninsula Blackout 2025: What We Know (and Don’t) Skip to content
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What we know – and don’t – about the April 2025 Iberian Peninsula Power Blackout

As the recent Iberian Peninsula power blackout underscored, ensuring that electricity grids are modern, resilient, and flexible is essential, whether here in the U.S. or abroad. As the clean energy transition continues to unfold, SEPA is increasingly focused on leveraging global insights to enable U.S. industry leaders to stay agile and informed, fostering collaboration and learning across the global energy ecosystem.

Q&A

What happened with the power grid in Spain, Portugal, and parts of France on April 28, 2025?

During the early afternoon of Monday, April 28, 2025, the power grid in Spain experienced a cascading event and lost about 60% of its power generation. The sudden 15 gigawatt loss in electricity generation impacted grid frequencies and stability across the integrated Iberian Peninsula grid, leading to a nearly daylong blackout across Spain, Portugal, and parts of southern France. By late Monday evening, Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN), Portugal’s national electricity and natural gas transmission system operator, had restored 85 of 89 substations in Portugal. Red Eléctrica de España (REE, “Red Eléctrica”), Spain’s national electricity transmission system operator, had restored nearly all demand in Spain by Tuesday morning.

What caused the power grid failure in Europe? (Spoiler: We don’t know yet.)

Understanding the triggers behind a blackout across a large, integrated, diverse network is complicated.

The official causes of the April 2025 power grid failure in Spain, Portugal, and parts of southern France are under investigation. The Spanish government has established a national investigation committee, the European Union’s Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators announced an independent audit (at Portugal’s request), and other investigations are underway. This is similar to the investigation process that occurred following the 2003 blackout in the United States and the subsequent U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force and report.

While official reports are forthcoming, in initial press statements, the Spanish government and Red Eléctrica emphasized that the power outage was not due to renewable energy generation because the system has “worked to perfection with a similar demand situation and with a similar [electric generation] mix” and also ruled out a cyberattack. [1]

However, as sources including the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) have highlighted, the electrical inertia profiles and responses of different generation resources that are part of the grid mix are a key factor in stabilizing grid frequency and voltage during sudden fluctuations or imbalances. Inverter-based resources like solar and wind provide limited frequency regulation compared to other generation (e.g., hydropower, nuclear, natural gas) if not paired with advanced inverters that provide grid-support functions such as synthetic inertia and voltage regulation.

As additional data emerges on the grid conditions at the time of the event, U.S. energy industry stakeholders can learn from recent challenges and leverage future recommendations.

How does the power system in this part of Europe compare to the United States? Do they have the same or similar standards for preventing blackouts?

Spain, Portugal, and the U.S. each operate advanced and highly coordinated power systems, but their structures differ in key ways that affect how they plan for and respond to outages. See Table 1 for an in-depth comparison of the planning, operations, and reliability standards of the power systems in the U.S., Spain, and Portugal.

Spain and Portugal each have a single national transmission operator and balancing authority—REE and REN—while the U.S. grid is divided into dozens of balancing authorities and local balancing areas, coordinated by multiple transmission system operators or utilities depending on location. In the U.S., the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) develops mandatory reliability standards, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) provides enforcement. [2] In contrast, Spain and Portugal follow EU-wide standards set by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), which are legally binding across the EU. [3]

Both systems aim to ensure reliability, but differences in governance, planning, and enforcement shape how each responds to grid events like the April 28th blackout. By effectively breaking down Spain and Portugal’s power system structures and systems as it relates to planning, operations and governance, U.S. energy stakeholders can draw comparisons on how we can learn and apply lessons from this event.

The grid is old, both in Europe and here in the United States. Are all these new technologies straining the system?

Not inherently. Inverter-based resources (e.g., wind, solar, and battery storage) and distributed energy resources (DERs) can strengthen the grid when planned and coordinated effectively. Without proper integration, they can create challenges, like voltage fluctuations, reduced visibility, and operational uncertainty. Investigators of the recent Iberian Peninsula blackout will be delving into issues of a lack of coordinated system planning, systems integration, and response that can lead to grid instability.

Both the U.S. and Europe are modernizing how they plan and operate the grid. In both systems, transmission and distribution operators play an active role in planning. The EU uses a Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) coordinated across 36 European countries, while many U.S. utilities conduct integrated resource plans (IRP) and distribution system plans (DSP). As more distributed and intermittent resources connect to the grid, stronger coordination between transmission and distribution planning is needed to ensure reliable and resilient operations.

Deploying enabling technologies for these resources, such as advanced inverters, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS), and grid-forming inverters allow grid operators to use DERs to support voltage, frequency, and peak load—turning them into grid assets rather than risks. [4]

The technologies are capable – the challenge is system-wide coordination.

Check out SEPA Resources: Decoding DERMS: Options for the Future of DER Management

What else is happening around the United States to improve system reliability?

The U.S. power system is very reliable – according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the average customer experiences less than two hours of power outages each year. Reliability refers to keeping the lights on consistently and without interruption.

For U.S. utilities, maintaining reliability alongside safety and affordability is the main objective. In order to meet that objective, utilities regularly evaluate their systems through annual DSPs, IRPs, and grid modernization proceedings to identify investments to improve system reliability. [5] These investments include traditional reliability improvements, like replacing poles and wires, improving redundancy, and upgrading substations, and next generation solutions, such as virtual power plants (VPPs), microgrids, and DERMs to improve system reliability and flexibility.

There are also efforts in the U.S. to establish new frameworks and redefine metrics and processes around system reliability and resilience. Tools like SEPA and NRECA’s Resilience Planning Playbook provide a framework and best practices for utilities to take a broader view of planning that includes evolving risks and community needs. Coordinated industry efforts, such as NERC’s working groups and industry strategies (e.g., Inverter-Based Resource Strategy and System Planning Impacts from Distributed Energy Resources Working Group) are also underway in the U.S. to increase focus on grid stability and improve system reliability.

Check out SEPA Resources:

What about the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather? Does that increase the risk of blackouts here in the United States?

Similar to Europe, the U.S. is experiencing an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather. In 2024, the U.S. experienced 27 weather and climate disaster events with losses exceeding $1 billion each, and billion-dollar events have impacted all 50 states in the last decade.

Having a reliable and resilient energy system – one that delivers power and can withstand and bounce back from events – is critical. The total cost of power outages to American businesses is around $150 billion every year, and storm-related outages alone cost the American economy between $20 billion and $55 billion annually.

On top of traditional reliability investments, electric utilities are investing in projects that aim to increase grid resilience and mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events, such as microgrid solutions for at-risk communities or leveraging and coordinating customer resources (e.g., electric vehicles, battery energy storage systems) to provide backup power. Critically, the adoption of resilience planning frameworks has also become more widely recognized nationwide. Between May 2022 and June 2024, 30 utilities filed one or more resilience plans covering 47 million customers and with the aim to improve grid resilience for roughly 130 million people (or 39% of the U.S. population), with many more utilities also incorporating resilience within other utility planning processes.

Check out SEPA resources:

Wrap-up

While investigations continue in Europe, SEPA continues to work with our diverse membership towards a clean, affordable, and resilient energy grid here in the U.S., and to identify and share solutions to the biggest challenges facing utilities, their partners, and policymakers.

Want to dive deeper and learn on-the-ground? Join us on SEPA’s 2025 Executive Fact Finding Mission to Portugal (October 26-31).

Questions? For SEPA members, email our complimentary member research service, staffed by SEPA experts: [email protected]

Appendix

Detailed comparison of power systems in the U.S., Spain, and Portugal

 

Category United States Spain Portugal
Grid Interconnection Three major interconnections (Eastern, Western, ERCOT) EU grid (two interconnections with France, multiple interconnections with Portugal) EU grid (multiple interconnections with Spain)
National Energy Policies No single national policy or plan; guided by federal laws, Department of Energy goals, and state-level mandates MITECO established the Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima (NECP 2021–2030) that targets 81% renewable electricity by 2030. [6] MAAC established the Plano Nacional Energia e Clima (NECP); targets 85% renewables in electricity by 2030 and phasing out coal. [7]
Transmission System Operations ISOs/RTOs (e.g., NYISO, CAISO, PJM, MISO, SPP, ISO-NE ) in competitive markets; vertically integrated utilities elsewhere [8] Red Eléctrica de España (REE) Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN)
Distribution System Operations Investor-owned utilities (IOUs), municipal utilities, electric cooperatives regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs), governing boards, and/or municipalities. Multiple regional distribution system operators (DSOs) regulated by CNMC [9] Single regional DSO (E-REDES), regulated by ERSE [10]
Transmission and Distribution Planning No national framework. Coordination varies based on state rules and ISO participation. Formal PUC-regulated distribution system planning (DSP) processes in some states to encourage integrated planning. REE consults DSOs to develop the Transmission Development Plan, which accounts for demand growth, DER growth, and distribution constraints. CNMC ensures TSO and DSO alignment. REN consults E-REDES to develop the Transmission Development Plan, which accounts for demand growth, DER growth, and distribution constraints. ERSE ensures TSO and DSO alignment.
Planning Authority Utilities and ISOs submit grid plans, to be approved by PUCs and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), respectively REE submits grid plans to be approved by MITECO in coordination with CNMC REN submits plans to be approved by MAAC in coordination with ERSE
Regulatory Oversight FERC (transmission) + state PUCs (distribution) MITECO (Transmission Grid Development Plan) and CNMC (distribution) MAAC (Transmission Grid Development Plan) and ERSE (distribution)
Market Operations Regional market operators (e.g. PJM, CAISO) OMIE (via MIBEL) [11] [12] OMIE (via MIBEL)
Grid Coordination NERC regions; limited federal coordination ENTSO-E (EU) + MIBEL ENTSO-E (EU) + MIBEL
Balancing Authority Dozens of balancing authority areas (BAAs) across ISOs and utilities REE (national) REE (national)
Dispatch & Frequency Control Regional BAAs and ISOs via NERC rules REE via ENTSO-E platform, PICASSO [13] REN via ENTSO-E platform, PICASSO
Reliability Standards Mandatory NERC reliability standards (e.g., PRC, BAL, CIP) enforced by FERC and Regional Entities; compliance is auditable and penalized if violated. ENTSO-E standards via EU Network Codes; implemented by REE under CNMC oversight. ENTSO-E standards via EU Network Codes; implemented by REN with ERSE oversight.
Blackstart Protocols Blackstart plans are utility-developed and NERC-mandated. National blackstart plans led by REE; coordinated with EU guidance and part of contingency planning under ENTSO-E frameworks. Blackstart procedures managed by REN under national protocol, aligned with ENTSO-E principles and coordinated with Spain.

 


References:
  1. In 2024, more than half of Spain’s electricity came from renewable energy resources, and on April 16th, 2025, Spain’s grid ran entirely on renewable energy (wind, solar, and hydropower), with solar resources setting a new record only five days later, covering over 75% of demand and 60% of grid mix. However, the Iberian Peninsula is also considered an “energy island,” with an interconnection ratio of 3.4%, well below European Union targets of 10-15%. Additionally, Spain has only 25 megawatts (MW) of installed battery energy storage capacity (versus a 500 MW target by 2025).
  2. NERC is the federally designated authority responsible for developing mandatory reliability standards for the bulk power system across the U.S., Canada, and parts of Mexico. NERC operates under the oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the U.S.
  3. ENTSO-E is a regional body that coordinates electricity grid planning, operations, and cross-border reliability standards in 36 European countries among European TSOs. ENTSO-E develops technical frameworks like the Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP), but its standards are implemented and enforced by national regulators.
  4. Advanced inverters are designed to work autonomously to support grid stability by managing voltage and frequency; including simulating synthetic inertia like the inertial response of traditional generators.
  5. See the N.C. Clean Energy Technology Center 50 States of Grid Modernization reports
  6. MITECO: Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico – Spain’s Ministry for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenges, who is responsible for national energy strategy, approving the Transmission Grid Development Plan, and aligning Spain’s grid investments with EU energy and climate goals.
  7. MAAC: Ministério do Ambiente e da Ação Climática – Portugal’s Ministry of Environment and Climate Action, who sets national energy and climate policy, develops the country’s NECP, and ensures that grid planning by REN and ERSE aligns with EU decarbonization and electrification goals.
  8. Regional reliability organizations operate under NERC’s authority to implement and monitor those standards within their specific region.
  9. CNMC: Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia – Spain’s national energy regulator overseeing markets and grid operations.
  10. CNMC: Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia – Spain’s national energy regulator overseeing markets and grid operations.
  11. OMIE: Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energía – Iberian Peninsula electricity market operator, responsible for day-ahead and intraday market clearing in both Spain and Portugal.
  12. MIBEL: Mercado Ibérico de Electricidade – The Iberian Electricity Market, which integrates the Spanish and Portuguese power markets.
  13. PICASSO: Platform for the International Coordination of Automated Frequency Restoration and Stable System Operation, which is the centralized EU platform managed by ENTSO-E to coordinate automatic frequency restoration reserve across participating European countries

Authors:


Jared Leader, Senior Director, Research and Industry Strategy, Resilience
Kate Strickland, Director, Strategic Projects
Yok Potts, Director, Research and Industry Strategy, Policy
Lesley Jantarasami, Vice President, Research and Industry Strategy

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